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“Trust me, it’s only for me”: ‘Revenge Porn’ and the Criminal Law 
Alisdair A. Gillespie* 
 
The Obscene Publications Act 1959 (OPA) can probably legitimately be considered to be 
the first modern statute that sought to control access to, inter alia, pornography. Since 
that Act has been passed there have been ten other pieces of legislation that have sought 
to control pornography in England & Wales. Recent years have seen an acceleration in 
the number of legislative instruments being passed, with six being introduced since 2000. 
The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 introduced two new offences relating to 
pornography. Section 33 criminalises the disclosure of private sexual photographs and 
films (tackling so-called ‘revenge porn’) and s.37 widens the definition of extreme 
pornography to encompass images of rape. This article seeks to explore one of these new 
offences – revenge pornography – and seeks to understand why it was introduced, 
whether it will meet its aims, and whether there were alternatives to doing so. 
 
The new offence 
The new offence does not mention the term ‘revenge pornography’ but it is clear from 
Hansard that this was the reasoning behind its introduction.1 The offence was introduced 
at a relatively late stage, the original Bill making no mention of this provision even by the 
time it completed its passage through the House of Commons. An Early Day Motion2 
urged the government to introduce legislation to combat this phenomenon and the 
House of Lords introduced an amendment to do so. 3 The government agreed to work 
with the Lords and ultimately s.33 was created. 
 
Section 33(1) states: 
It is an offence for a person to disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the 
disclosure is made- 
(a) without the consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or 
film, and 
                                                 
*  Professor of Criminal Law and Justice, Lancaster University. The author wishes to acknowledge 
the assistance of the editor, and Professor Michael Hirst in respect of a point on the mens rea of 
this offence. 
1  See section 33 of the Explanatory Notes.  
2  Early Day Motion 192 of Session 2014-15 sponsored by Julian Huppert MP, Tim Farron MP, 
Peter Bottomley MP, Alan Meale MP, Greg Mulholland MP and Julian Lewis MP. 
3  Hansard, HL Debates, vol 755, col.968, 21 July 2014 noting an amendment by Lord Marks of 
Henley-on-Thames. 
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(b) with the intention of causing that individual distress. 
 
It is not an offence to disclose the photograph4 to an individual who features in it. 5 
Presumably this provision was included to ensure that there was no danger that a couple 
who consensually agree to film themselves in a sexualised way would be criminalised for 
showing each other that image as part of their relationship. However this section would 
not have been required for this purpose as s.33(1) clearly indicates mens rea, that being the 
intention to cause distress. Where X and Y look at the photograph they took of each 
other then there would, presumably, be no intention to cause distress. However the 
blanket exemption causes problems in other contexts: 
 
D films himself and V having sexual intercourse in his bedroom. Three days later 
he shows V the image saying ‘I’ve got a little souvenir of our time together’. This 
causes V considerable distress because she did not know she was being recorded 
and is fearful of what D may do with the image. 
 
This would not be an offence under s.33(1) because D has only shown the image to the 
person that is featured within it, something protected by s.33(2). Of course this may not 
be a loophole because D may well have committed the offence of voyeurism.6 However 
it is not necessarily that easy. 
 
D and V decide ‘for a bit of fun’ to record V performing a sex act on D. After 
watching it D promises V that he will delete the footage. In fact he does not. A 
week after V ends the relationship with D he contacts her and shows her the 
footage saying “look what I’ve got”.  
 
The above example could cause V considerable distress and yet would not infringe 
s.33(1) because of s.33(2). Nor could D be guilty of voyeurism because the recording was 
consensual. This is odd. V would have to rely on the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
                                                 
4  Whilst s.34(4)-(8) defines ‘photograph’ this article will not consider this definition as it is largely 
non-contentious and therefore reference will be made to ‘photograph’ throughout this article. 
There remains an issue about pseudo-photographs that is picked up below. 
5  s.33(2), CJCA 2015. 
6  s.67, Sexual Of f ences Act 2003. 
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although this would require a course of conduct, or if it was disclosed to her through a 
communications device, then communication offences could be used. 7 
 
Three further defences are introduced by the Act: 
 
• D reasonably believed the disclosure was necessary for the purposes of 
preventing, detecting or investigating crime (s.33(3)). 8 
• D made the disclosure in the course of, or with a view to, the publication of 
journalistic material and he or she reasonably believed that publication of the 
material was in the public interest (s.33(4)). 9 
• D reasonably believed the footage had been disclosed for reward (by the 
individual or anyone else) and he or she had no reason to believe that the 
previous disclosure was made without the consent of the person who features in 
it (s.33(5)). 
 
The second and third defences require D to prove the facts above although it is clear that 
it is an evidential burden, with D required to adduce ‘sufficient evidence of the 
matter…to raise an issue with respect to it’. The prosecution must then disprove this 
beyond all reasonable doubt. 10 The first defence however imposes no burden on D. 
 
Disclosure and Consent 
At the heart of this offence are the concepts of ‘disclosing’ and ‘consent’. The former is 
relatively easy to define. Section 34(2) states ‘a person “discloses” something if, by any 
means, he or she gives or shows it to the person or makes it available to the person”. The 
Act states that whether it is disclosed for reward is irrelevant11 as is whether it has 
previously been given, shown or made available. 12 
                                                 
7  Malicious Communications Act 1988, s.1 (which was itself amended by the CJCA 2015 when s.32 
increased the maximum penalty to two years’ imprisonment) or Communications Act 2003, s.127. 
Both of these provisions are discussed below. 
8  Interestingly nothing in the Act requires the disclosure in such circumstances to be to the police 
although presumably who it was disclosed to will be a factor in judging its reasonableness. 
9  This may appear an unusual defence but it has been suggested that if, for example, at that time a 
photograph of Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky was disclosed by someone to a journalist, this 
would be an example of a newsworthy story and an action that should not be criminalised: C. 
Barmore ‘Criminalization in Context: Involuntariness, Obscenity, and the First Amendment’ 
(2015) 67 Stanford Law Review 447-478 at 470. 
10  s.33(6), CJCA 2015. 
11  s.34(3)(a), CJCA 2015. 
12  Ibid., s.34(3)(b). 
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It is unlikely that either ‘gives’ or ‘shows’ is going to cause any problems in interpretation. 
The expression ‘make available’ is something that can be applied in a number of 
contexts, particularly in respect of technology. In the context of indecent photographs of 
children it was held in R v Dooley13 that ‘making available’ can include use of Peer-to-Peer 
networks where material is left in the ‘my shared’ folderand there is no reason to suppose 
that the same should not apply to the offence of revenge pornography.14 By the same 
logic, placing images onto a web-hosting service, social network site etc. should 
constitute ‘making available’. 
 
The second issue is that of consent. The offence is only triggered where the image is 
disclosed without the consent of the individuals who are featured within the image. The 
Act is silent as to what happens where multiple people are in the photograph. The logical 
response would be to require consent from all those featured although that potentially 
raises an oddity, which is expanded upon below. 
 
‘Consent’ is not specifically defined although s.33(7)(a) states that ‘consent…includes 
general consent covering the disclosure, as well as consent to the particular disclosure’. 
This would suggest there is no requirement to show the individual consented to each and 
every distribution (which would be problematic) but the Act is silent on the converse. So 
what of the following position? 
 
D, a citizen of Sweden, takes a sexualised picture of V, her British girlfriend, as 
an ‘art project’. V consents to the image being disclosed in a discreet art 
exhibition in Sweden believing few people that know her would ever see such an 
exhibition. In fact D uploads the picture to a pornography site and it is seen by a 
number of V’s work colleagues. 
 
Setting aside mens rea for a moment, could D be culpable under s.33? Section 33(7)(a) 
suggests a person can give general consent but what about limited consent? In other 
words, can V specify those to whom the image may be disclosed such that if D went 
                                                 
13  [2006] 1 WLR 775; [2006] Crim LR 544. 
14  Dooley raised an issue of mens rea but that is specific to indecent photographs of children and the 
ratio of that offence would not apply to the offence of revenge pornography as here it is part of 
the actus reus. 
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beyond that he would act without V’s consent? Ordinary understandings of consent 
would suggest that V can provide specific limits on consent15 but why did Parliament not 
make that express if it felt it necessary to introduce s.33(7)(a)? Realistically this subsection 
is superfluous as it could have been left to contemporary understandings of consent. 
 
Private and Sexual 
The image disclosed must be private and sexual. These terms are defined in s.35. ‘Private’ 
means ‘it shows something that is not of a kind ordinarily seen in public’ 16. Interestingly 
the section does not require that it is done in private (thus it could apply to public spaces, 
something not the case in respect of voyeurism17) but simply requires that the act is not 
one ordinarily done in public. What is the point of this section? It is very difficult to 
conceive of a sexual activity that would ordinarily be done in public and by not requiring 
the actual act to be done in private the section appears superfluous. Realistically the only 
relevant test is whether the activity recorded is sexual. 
 
A photograph is sexual if: 
 
(a) it shows all or part of an individual’s exposed genitals or pubic area, 
(b) it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual 
because of its nature, or 
(c) its content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would 
consider it to be sexual. 18 
 
To an extent this is largely uncontroversial, but rather than create another definition of 
‘sexual’ it would have been sensible to use existing definitions, most notably that given in 
s.78, Sexual Offences Act 2003. Section .35(3)(a) would still have been required because the 
depiction of the genitals or pubic area is not by itself sexual. However paragraph (a) 
raises other questions. We can presume the reference to ‘exposed’ must apply equally to 
genitals and the pubic region because otherwise photographs of a person in underwear 
could potentially be caught. By why only genitals? The female breast is not considered a 
genital and so this potentially limits the offence. For example, if V sends a picture of 
                                                 
15  See, for example, R (on the application of  F) v DPP [2014] QB 581. 
16  s.35(2). 
17  ss.67(1), 68(1), Sexual Of f ences Act 2003 and see A.A.Gillespie ‘ “Upskirts” and “down-blouses”: 
Voyeurism and the Law’ [2008] Crim LR 370-382. 
18  s.35(3). 
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herself topless to D and he subsequently uploads this to an internet sex site, is that 
caught by s.33? 
 
Of course it could in principle be covered under s.35(3)(b) or (c) but this will inevitably 
depend on context. Whilst a picture of V posing topless in a sexualised way would be 
caught by the provisions of s.35(3) it is unlikely that a photograph of a female posing 
topless on a beach would. This could be problematic: 
 
V, an 18-year-old female, is on holiday with two of her friends (X and Y) for the 
first time alone. Despite knowing their parents would disapprove, V, X and Y 
decide to sunbathe topless on the beach because they feel it is unlikely that they 
would be recognised by anyone. X has taken photographs during the day. The 
penultimate night of the holiday V and X have a verbal fight. When they return, 
X sends an email to V to say, ‘I’ve had enough of you. I took a picture of you on 
the beach and I’ve emailed it to your parents. Let’s see what they make of their 
little daughter with her bits hanging out’. 
 
In the example above it would seem that the offence under s.33 would not apply  for two 
reasons. The first is that s.35(2) would not apply in that topless sunbathing is something 
that is ordinarily done in public so it is probably not a private act, and  the second is that 
it is highly unlikely that it would be considered sexual. However X is almost certainly 
acting in order to cause distress, and the photograph itself is unquestionably private and 
one that V would not want distributing. It seems a little odd that this photograph is not 
caught by the Act. If we ignore the requirement that it be a private act (that I have 
previously argued is superfluous) – so it was a photograph of the three of them posing 
topless as part of a drunken game inside a house – the sexual element is probably still not 
satisfied but this is certainly an image that V would not want circulating and which is 
being circulated to cause distress. Subject to what is said below, it could be thought that 
this would be a good example of conduct that should be tackled by this offence. 
 
Section 35(5) then adds another twist to the meaning of private and sexual. This 
subsection applies only to a photograph that is altered or which is a composite. 19 Such 
photograph is not considered to be private and sexual if: 
                                                 
19  s.35(4). 
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(a) it does not consist of or include a photographed or filmed image that is 
itself private and sexual, 
(b) it is only private or sexual by virtue of the alteration or combination 
mentioned in subsection (4), 20 or 
(c) it is only by virtue of the alteration or combination mentioned in 
subsection (4) that the person mentioned in section 33(1)(a) and (b) is 
shown as part of, or with, whatever makes the photograph or film private 
and sexual. 
 
This is obviously addressing the issue of pseudo-photographs -  those images that have 
been the subject of alteration or produced through splicing additional images together. 
However it potentially removes a large sub-set of images from the scope of the offence. 
Let us take an example: 
 
D and V work together. D is obsessed by V and wishes to be in a romantic 
relationship but V is not interested. Using a graphic manipulation package, D 
takes a photograph of V from her Facebook page and superimposes her head 
from that photograph onto a pornographic image of a porn star. The resultant 
image makes it look as if V is performing a sex act on herself. D sends this image 
to everyone at work. 
 
It would seem that this would not contravene s.33 because of s.35(5)(c). It is only the 
alteration or combination – the splicing of the head to the body – that makes the 
photograph private and sexual. However is it likely that V’s colleagues will realise that 
this image is fake? Computer manipulation packages are so sophisticated that spotting 
fake images is not always easy. Assuming D does this for the purposes of causing V 




It was noted above that the Act is silent as to who must give consent and this, in 
combination with the definitions of sexual, could lead to interesting questions where 
                                                 
20  This simply describes the way that footage can be adapted or combined.  
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multiple persons are featured in the footage. Whilst admittedly the example that follows 
would be somewhat unusual, it is plausible: 
 
A agrees to be recorded by C performing a sex act on B. Unbeknown to A, B and 
C, X is visible in the resultant footage clearly watching A and B engaging in this 
sexual act. C realises that X is a local church minister and he tells X that he has 
sent the footage to his congregation to show them ‘what kind of person he is’. C 
knows this will cause X distress but does so anyway. 
 
It is unclear whether C would be culpable under the legislation. The syntax of the 
legislation leaves it unclear. Section 33(1)(a) would appear to be satisfied because the 
footage that is disclosed is sexual and is disclosed without the ‘consent of an individual 
who appears in the photograph’ (ie X). The Act does not say that the person in s.33(1)(a) 
has to be the person who is performing or engaging in the private, sexual act although 
that is clearly what Parliament intended. However the wording does not achieve this. 
Section 33(1)(a) requires a photograph to be disclosed without the consent of an 
individual who appears in the photograph. X appears in the photograph. It is sexual for 
the purposes of s.35 if, inter alia, it shows something that a reasonable person would 
consider sexual. Clearly this test is satisfied and thus the offence under s.33 would appear 
complete. However it would be odd in the example above if A and B are happy for the 
footage to be shown but X’s lack of consent means that any disclosure becomes criminal 
when the mischief would appear to be to safeguard the sexual autonomy of the person(s) 
featured (discussed further below).  
 
Mens Rea 
The mens rea requirement for this offence is quite specific. By virtue of s.33(1)(b) D must 
act ‘with the intention of causing that individual distress’, thus the offence is one of 
intent. The requirement is that D intends to cause V distress which would ordinarily be 
considered to be an emotion more severe than, but related to, upset. However other 
instruments that mention distress do not restrict themselves to this one emotion21 and 
this must provide more flexibility where the intent is to do something else.   
 
                                                 
21  See, for example, s.1, Malicious Communications Act 1988 (distress or anxiety) or s.4A, Public Order 
Act 1986 (harassment, alarm or distress). 
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The Act then continues by stating ‘[a] person charged with an offence under this section 
is not to be taken to have distributed a photograph or film with the intention of causing 
distress merely because that was a natural and probable consequence of the disclosure’ 
(s.33(8)). This obviously relates to the issue of oblique intent but the inclusion of this 
wording is confusing. The first problem is the use of the term ‘natural and probable 
consequences’ which has, of course, been disapproved of as the test for oblique intent. 22 
Presumably its use was included to reflect the language of s.8 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1967 but this simply adds to the confusion. 
 
Section 8 states that a jury is not bound to infer intention from the fact that it was the 
natural and probable consequences of the act. This is now accepted to mean that the jury 
can find intent (but only where it meets the Woollin threshold) but that they do not have to 
find intent. 23 Section 33(8) would initially appear to suggest the converse – ‘a person…is 
not to be taken to have…’ – but this cannot be correct since it concludes ‘merely because 
that was a natural and probable consequence’ which indicates that there are 
circumstances when oblique intent could apply.  
 
Perhaps Parliament was concerned that there would be some legitimate disclosures that 
would inevitably cause distress (and thus caught by oblique intent) and for which they 
did not believe criminal liability would be appropriate. Let us take two examples: 
 
Example A 
X is sent a film that shows A and B engaging in a sex act in the primary school 
classroom where A works. X sends the footage to the headmistress of the school. 
 
Example B 
D recorded footage of V engaging in an explicit sex show. After they split up, D 
sends the footage to V’s headteacher at a faith-school where V works. 
 
Section 33(8) could be an attempt to criminalise the behaviour in Example B but exclude 
example A. It could be said in example A that X is potentially liable because distress is 
virtually certain to be caused by A’s dismissal (a likely consequence of the disclosure). 
However this culpability only arises because distress is a ‘natural and probable 
                                                 
22  R v Nedrick [1986] 1 WLR 1025 and R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82, [1998] CRIM LR 890. 
23  R v Matthews and Alleyne [2003] 2 Cr App R 30, [2003] Crim LR 533. 
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consequence’ of the reporting. There was no apparent malice in the reporting but if 
oblique intent were to apply then X could be liable.  
 
In example B there would similarly be the oblique intent to cause distress (as the direct 
intent is likely to have D dismissed from her job) but it cannot be said that D’s intention 
to cause distress arises merely from the natural and probable consequences of the 
reporting. The reasons for disclosure and the person to whom the footage is disclosed 
would suggest that the actions were deliberate and for an ulterior purpose. Thus this is 
more than merely relying on the natural and probable consequence, meaning intent could 
be inferred. 
 
Assuming this is correct then Parliament has adopted a very long-winded solution to the 
problem. It could have simply relied on s.8, CLA 1967 as the jury could decide in 
scenario A that it did not wish to infer intent under those circumstances. It is conceded 
however that would be somewhat high-risk since s.8 is not particularly clearly drafted 
itself. The alternative would have been to create a defence of disclosing for a legitimate 
purpose. This could have encompassed the existing defences and also catered for 
example A above. By creating s.33(8) Parliament has arguably muddied the waters by 




As the offence has been outlined and, it is submitted, flaws have been detected in its 
drafting, it is worth noting why the offence was introduced and what the justification is 
for acting against revenge pornography. There has been some concern in recent years 
that the law is becoming increasingly paternalistic in its attitude to pornography24 and 
some may argue that this section follows this pattern. It will be shown, however, that this 
is not the case. 
 
Relatively little has been said about why the offence was justified, partly because it was 
introduced at the Lords stage by way of amendment, and partly because it was almost 
                                                 
24  Carline, A. ‘Criminal justice, extreme pornography and prostitution: Protecting women or 
promoting morality?’ (2011) 14 Sexualities 312-333. It should be noted that not everyone agrees 
with this and it has been argued that the ‘cultural harm’ produced by pornography can justify 
criminalisation: see McGlynn, C. and Rackley, E. ‘Criminalising extreme pornography: a lost 
opportunity’ [2009] Crim LR 245-260 at 257 et seq. 
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universally supported by Parliament. A number of different rationales were put forward, 
including causing victims psychological trauma,25 a breach of an intimate relationship26 or 
a desire to humiliate ex partners. 27 Reference is also made to the fact that there could be 
consequences to the images being posted, including loss of employment. 28 This echoes 
the literature that exists in respect of revenge porn laws in the USA. There, along with 
making reference to these effects, the primary justification put forward is that it 
constitutes an infringement of privacy. 29  
 
The difficulty with these justifications is that revenge porn is not unique in this respect. 
There are many aspects of a person’s life which, if disclosed, could cause distress and the 
loss of employment etc. However breaches of privacy have not ordinarily been protected 
by the criminal law (save, for example, where they amount to harassment). For example, 
the disclosure of infidelity could have an impact on employment status in some 
professions, details of a person’s sexuality could cause distress where they wish to keep 
this private and the release of medical information could lead to both. For example: if D 
discloses that V is H.I.V. positive in circumstances where this could cause 
embarrassment or distress (because, for example, friends or colleagues would not 
understand, or it would result in the loss of employment) the consequences could be 
significant. The disclosure of such private and sensitive information is central to their 
identity and autonomy but we would not consider such disclosure to be a criminal wrong 
(save where it constitutes a pattern of behaviour30). 
 
Therefore we need to consider alternative reasons for criminalising revenge porn. It has 
been suggested by some that revenge pornography should be criminalised because it can 
lead to offline harassment or stalking31, but this is not particularly convincing. There are 
lots of acts that can lead to harassment or stalking, but not every such act is criminalised. 
Indeed, it is the fact that ordinary behaviour can constitute harassment or stalking that 
                                                 
25  Hansard, HC Deb, vol 589, col 122. 1 December 2014. 
26  Hansard, HL Deb, vol 755, col 969. 21 July 2014. Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.  
27  Hansard, HL Deb, vol 755, col 971. 21 July 2014. Baroness Berridge. 
28  Hansard, HL Deb, vol 755, col 971. 21 July 2014. Baroness Berridge. 
29  Citron, DK and Franks, MA ‘Criminalizing Revenge Porn’ (2014) 49 Wake Forest Law Review 345-
391 and Barmore, C. ‘Criminalization in Context: Involuntariness, Obscenity, and the First 
Amendment’ (2015) 67 Stanford Law Review 447-478. 
30  Where it could amount to harassment contrary to the Prevention f rom Harassment Act 1997. 
31  Martinez, C. ‘An argument for states to outlaw ‘Revenge Porn’ and for Congress to Amend 47 
USC 230’ (2014) 1 Journal of  Technology Law and Policy 236-252 at 239.  
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led to Parliament deciding to criminalise a course of conduct for harassment and stalking 
rather than relying on individual acts. 32 
 
During the passage of the Bill, an interesting statement was made in the House of 
Commons where it was said that disclosing intimate pictures in this way amounted to a 
breach of consent33 and this, or perhaps an adaption of this argument, may be a stronger 
basis to justify criminalisation. Perhaps the reason for criminalising such conduct is that 
it is a breach of the individual’s ability to control their own (sexual) identity. 
 
A parallel can arguably be drawn with voyeurism. The voyeur gazes on a person without 
their consent and, in the same way, the distributor allows others to do this. Whilst the 
voyeur will do this for sexual gratification34 the revenge pornographer will not. However, 
it is submitted that the underlying wrong does not change because of this. Both revenge 
pornography and voyeurism involve the misuse of the image of a person’s body without 
their consent. It has been suggested by Calvert and Brown that a difficulty with the 
posting of the images of an individual is that it interferes with the ‘ability of individuals to 
control the flow of information about themselves’, 35 which would seem an echo of the 
same arguments that were rejected above. However if instead of ‘information’ we 
consider the integrity of the individual, the sense of what Calvert and Brown says is not 
lost and indeed it becomes more potent. The essential wrong in both voyeurism and 
revenge pornography is that it is an attack on the bodily integrity of an individual. 
 
It can be said that both the voyeur and the discloser ‘fail to show proper regard for his 
victim as a chooser, manipulating her into doing things she would otherwise not do if 
fully ` aware of the circumstances’. 36 This comment is pertinent in the context of revenge 
pornography. In many instances images will have been gathered consensually but if the 
victim thought there was any chance that her partner would show the footage to others 
then she would not have agreed to the taking of them in the first place. More than this 
however it can be said that it is wrong because it fails to show common respect for the 
                                                 
32  For a good discussion on the genesis of the 1997 Act see Finch, E. The Criminalisation of  Stalking 
(2001, Cavendish: London). 
33  Hansard, HC Deb, vol 589, col 123. 1 December 2014. Julian Huppert MP. 
34  See, for example, R.S. Smith ‘Voyeurism: A Review of the Literature’ (1976) 5 Archives of  Sexual 
Behaviour 585-608. 
35  C. Calvert and J. Brown ‘Video Voyeurism, privacy and the internet: exposing peeping Toms in 
Cyberspace’ (2000) 18 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 469-568 at 488. 
36  Doyle, T. ‘Privacy and perfect voyeurism’ (2009) 11 Ethics and Information Technology 181-189 at 182 
citing Benn. 
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individual. 37 Whilst people are not ashamed of having sex, sex remains a personal and 
private act and one that (most) people would not wish to be seen doing. 38 The disclosing 
of sexualised footage offends this principle, and acts against the right of an autonomous 
individual to choose whether to disclose their sexual identity to others, and to whom. 
 
 It is sometimes said that consent to disclosure is simply a binary choice: you either 
consent to disclosure or not. 39 However that is too simplistic. Why should V, who 
decides that she is happy for her boyfriend to have a picture ‘to remember her by’, be 
deemed to have consented to the image being uploaded to the internet? We would not 
consider that an appropriate argument for any other form of sexual consent, so why 
should it apply to photographs? We must accept that consent can be limited and that just 
because V chooses to give an image to someone it does not mean that she would be 
happy for it to be disclosed to others. This is a fundamental part of sexual autonomy and 
identity, and it is this which the offence should be seeking to protect.  
 
Unfortunately the offence fails to secure the sexual autonomy and identity of an 
individual because of the way it is framed. As noted in the previous section it does not 
criminalise the non-consensual disclosure of a sexualised picture of an individual per se 
but only when it is done with the intent of causing distress.  
 
Alternatives 
The preceding sections have shown that the drafting of this offence is problematic and 
that it arguably does not tackle the underlying issue that should be protected, i.e. 
respecting the right of a person to control their sexual identity. Therefore this section 
considers alternative ways of tackling revenge pornography. 
 
Existing legislation 
The proposers of the Early Day Motion responsible for this offence indicated their belief 
that existing law could not tackle this phenomenon. However the Crown Prosecution 
                                                 
37  Ibid., at 183. 
38  Richards, DAJ ‘Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy’ (1979) 30 Hastings Law 
Journal 957-1018 at 980. 
39  Desai, S. ‘Smile for the Camera: The Revenge Pornography Dilemma, California’s Approach, and 
its Constitutionality’ (2015) 42 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 443-469 at 466. 
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Service did not agree with that suggestion, and have noted publicly that even before this 
offence came into force, existing laws applied. 40  
 
As revenge pornography includes sexualised imagery then it may seem that an obvious 
alternative would be to rely on the offence of obscenity. 41 Unlike the offences relating to 
prohibited images of children42 and extreme pornography, 43 this offence is not one of 
simple possession, but rather relates to the distribution of images, something that has 
previously been held to be ‘publication’ within the meaning of the OPA 1959. 44 However 
it is unlikely that the OPA 1959 would be an effective alternative. For the OPA 1959 to 
apply the material must be considered ‘obscene’ which, somewhat famously, requires that 
it is such that it would ‘deprave and corrupt’ its likely consumers. 45 This is now quite a 
high threshold46 and the reality is that it is unlikely to be met in respect of revenge 
pornography, where the acts portrayed are usually either nude photographs or persons 
engaging in mainstream sexual activity. It is highly unlikely that such material would 
constitute obscenity for these purposes and therefore other alternatives need to be 
sought. 
 
Where the material is disclosed through an electronic communications device – which is 
the most likely possibility47 – then two offences already exist to combat this crime. 
Section 1 of the Malicious Communications Act 1988 criminalises, inter alia, the sending of a 
communication that is indecent, grossly offensive, threatening or false, so long as there is 
an intention to cause distress or anxiety to a victim. Presumably the intention to cause 
distress was chosen for the purposes of s.33, CJCA 2015 because it was comparable to 
the MCA 1988, but the mens rea for the latter is wider by including intent to cause anxiety. 
 
Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003 makes it an offence to send, or cause to be 
sent, using a public communications network a message that is ‘grossly offensive or of an 
                                                 
40  ‘CPS offers clear guidance for prosecutors on “revenge pornography”’ 
(http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/crown_prosecution_service_offers_clear_guidance_f
or_prosecutors_on_revenge_pornography/)  
41  s.2, Obscene Publications Act 1959. 
42  Contrary to s.62, Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
43  Contrary to s.63. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. 
44  See, for example, R v McKinnon [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 46 and R v Waddon (2000, unreported) 
45  s.1(1), Obscene Publications Act 1959. 
46  A useful reference case is R v Perrin [2002] EWCA Crim 747 where a guilty verdict was only 
obtained in respect of adult pornographic material that was not hidden behind a ‘pay wall’. 
47  As most disclosures take place via smartphones or the Internet. 
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indecent, obscene or menacing character’. In DPP v Collins48 it was held by Lord Bingham 
that the purpose of s.127 is ‘to prohibit the use of a service provided and funded by the 
public for the benefit of the public for the transmission of communications which 
contravene the basic standards of our society’. 49 On the face of it there is no mens rea 
requirement, but it is clear that the message must be sent intentionally50 with it being 
likely that D must know that the message was grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or 
menacing. 51 
 
In the House of Commons it was said that these offences could not apply because the 
images would not necessarily be considered grossly offensive52 but this is undoubtedly 
the wrong element to focus on. Both the MCA 1988 and CA 2003 include reference to 
‘indecent’ and ‘obscene’ which are more likely to be applicable. The courts have warned 
that it is not their job to define these terms53 as they are ‘ordinary words of the English 
language’ and it ‘is unnecessary and may be misleading to give to a jury any interpretation 
of them.’ 54 They have also stated that the terms should be measured against recognised 
standards of decency, 55 something that accords with the dictionary definition, which 
suggests immodesty and a lack of decency. 56 Given the type of images that feature in 
revenge pornography (which, it will be remembered, will be either sexual or show a 
person’s genitals) it would seem inevitable that a tribunal of fact would consider such 
images to be at the very least indecent. That being the case, either the MCA 1988 or CA 
2003 could apply. 
 
A problem with both the MCA 1988 and the CA 2003 was that they carried a very low 
penalty - a maximum of six-months’ imprisonment. It has already been noted that s.32 of 
the CJCA 2015 has raised the maximum sentence for the MCA 1988 to two years’ 
imprisonment, the same as for an offence under s.33. 57 Given that the CPS believes (and 
it is submitted, correctly) that these offences could be used to combat revenge porn, 
would it not have been simpler to enact s.32 and not s.33? Certainly, s.33 is a more 
                                                 
48  [2006] 1 WLR 2223. 
49  Ibid., at 2227. 
50  Ibid., at 2228. 
51  Ibid. Technically Collins referred only to grossly offensive messages but there is no reason why  
52  See Hansard, HC Debates, vo 589, col 120. 1 December 2014 per Maria Miller MP.  
53  Unlike the OPA 1959 neither the MCA 1988 nor CA 2003 defines the term ‘obscene’. 
54  R v Kirk [2006] EWCA Crim 725 at [6]. 
55  DPP v Collins [2006] 1 WLR 2223 at at 2228. 
56  Concise Oxford English Dictionary. 
57  s.33(9). 
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complicated offence, and many of the technical issues presented above could have been 
avoided. The only argument in favour of a new offence is that of labelling. Those who 
intentionally disclose these images are not committing a communications offence - they 
are trying to commit an offence against a person. The MCA 1988  recognises this already 
because of its mens rea requirement that there is an intent to, inter alia, cause distress. It is 
not, unlike the CA 2003, an offence that could be construed as a victimless crime. The 
CA 2003 offence could be so construed because it is committed  whether or not the 
message is received by anybody58 or  whether or not the victim is aware of the conduct. 
To that extent it can be said to be an offence that directed to D’s actions over a 
communications network, rather than her actions towards a victim. 
 
An interesting question is whether the MCA 1988 or CA 2003 might be preferred in any 
event? The MCA 1988 now has the same penalty as s.33. Given the definition of 
‘indecent’ it may be that a prosecutor would consider it  simpler to prove the offence 
under s.1 rather than s.33. Certainly s.1 contains none of the defences that exist under 
s.33, and this raises a more general point. What is the position where D has an arguable 
case for  a defence under s.33? Could the CPS decide not to charge s.33 but  to charge 
s.1 instead? It might be considered unfair, but in law there is nothing to prevent it from 
happening,59 something of an issue whenever politicians use legislation as a political 
reaction, to show that ‘they are doing something’, irrespective of whether the law already 
tackles the behaviour. 60  
 
The Law in America 
The USA is sometimes referred to as a jurisdiction where revenge porn has already been 
tackled by the law, and so perhaps lessons could be learnt from there. Strictly speaking it 
is not true to say that ‘America’ has examined these issues since, so far, it has not been 
considered a Federal matter, but left to individual States to resolve. This remains the 
position although in other contexts the internet has been considered to be prima facie an 
                                                 
58  DPP v Collins at [2006] 1 WLR 2223 at 2227 per Lord Bingham.  
59  See, for example, R v G [2009] 1 AC 92 where the House of Lords refused to compel the CPS to 
initiate a charge under s.13, SOA 2003 (which would have allowed D to claim a defence) rather 
than s.5, SOA 2003 in circumstances where a 15-year old boy was accused of having sexual 
intercourse with a girl aged 12. The European Court of Human Rights later agreed with this 
ruling (G v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR SE25). 
60  Indeed the CA 2003 is itself perhaps an example of this where realistically it largely duplicates the 
MCA 1988, albeit without mens rea. However this replication existed before (see s.11(1)(b), Post 
Of f ice Act 1953 and s.43(1), Telecommunications Act 1984). Perhaps the best known recent example 
of legislating to criminalise something already illegal is the stalking legislation. Sections 2A and 4A 
criminalise behaviour already covered by sections 2 and 4 of the same Act. 
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issue of inter-state commerce (triggering Federal jurisdiction). 61 For whatever reason the 
Federal government has not yet sought to introduce a law governing revenge porn, 
although a number of states have acted to introduce their own laws. 
 
The State of New Jersey was the first US State to introduce a law relating to revenge 
porn. The Criminal Code states that a person commits an offence ‘if, knowing that he is 
not licensed…he discloses any photograph…or any other reproduction of the image of 
another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual 
penetration or contact, unless that person has consented to such disclosure’. 62 
 
Like the English offence, the issue at the heart of this offence is consent. However there 
is no requirement for ulterior intent, which implies that New Jersey recognises that the 
harm is caused by the breach of a person’s autonomy and right to control their own 
image rather than because D acts maliciously towards V. The offence has been praised by 
some for creating a tailored approach to revenge porn63 but there is a potential loophole. 
A defence applies where the actor provides prior notice of what he intends to do, and he 
acts for a lawful purpose. 64 ‘Lawful purpose’ is not defined, but if it is taken to 
encompass both civil and criminal matters could this seriously weaken the offence? Let 
us take an example: 
 
D and V are in a relationship. He films V performing a sex act on him, the 
recording take place with V’s consent. After their relationship ends, D writes to 
V to say that he intends to sell the picture to X, a third party. 
 
Since D filmed the encounter then presumably he owns the copyright to the film and so, 
if he were to sell this, would that be a lawful purpose? Take another example. 
 
D has consecutive relationships with A, B and C. He takes photographs of them 
nude with their consent as his ‘model’ as he makes clear to all three that he is a 
keen amateur photographer. Six months after his last relationship, he writes to A, 
                                                 
61  Article I, section 8 of the US Constitution and see US v Carroll 105 F.3d. 740 (1st Cir, 2007) cf US 
v Schaef er 501 F.3d. 1197 (10th Cir, 2007) and see s.103(a), Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of  
2007 which reworded 18 USC § 2252. 
62  NJ Criminal Code, Title 2C:14-9(c). 
63  Citron, DK and Franks, MA ‘Criminalizing Revenge Porn’ (2014) 49 Wake Forest Law Review 345-
391 at 371-372. 
64  NJ Criminal Code, Title 2C:14-9(d).  
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B and C to notify them that he intends to hold an art exhibition and the images 
of A, B and C will be displayed. 
 
Again, is this for a lawful purpose? An ordinary interpretation would appear to suggest 
that the answer is ‘yes’, and so the offence could be flawed. Of course the English 
offence would not cater for this latter example either, since it is unlikely that it would be 
possible in those circumstances to prove that D has the relevant ulterior intent. 65 
 
After New Jersey a number of other states began to introduce laws to combat revenge 
pornography. A number of these, like the English offence, contain an ulterior intent 
requirement. For example, the Alaskan state offence requires that a person acts ‘with 
intent to harass or annoy another person’ by, inter alia, publishing or distributing a 
photograph that shows the genitals, anus, female breast or depicts a sexual act. 66 Similar 
language is to be found in Colarado, 67 Georgia68 and Pennyslyvania. 69 ‘Harass’ or ‘annoy’ 
is, it is submitted, wider than the ‘distress’ required by the English law. It is perhaps 
strange that harassment was rejected under English law given that this is a term ordinarily 
understood in other contexts and it would seem to encapsulate much of the behaviour 
which is likely to occur. 
 
Not all States have adopted this model and other variants have problems that are  akin to 
the English offence. For example, the Texan law requires the ‘intent to arouse or gratify 
the sexual desire of any person’. 70 Whilst placing an image onto a sex site would probably 
breach this law (as some individuals will view these sites for the purposes of sexual 
gratification) it would not work in all contexts. For example: 
 
D and V, a school teacher at a religious school, are in a relationship during which 
D records them having sex. When the relationship ends D sends the recording to 
V’s employer intending that she will lose her job. 
 
                                                 
65  Indeed it is conceded that this example raises questions as to what actions concerning the 
disclosure of an image should be left the civil law rather than invoking the criminal law. 
66  Alaska Statutes § 11.61.120. 
67  Colarado Revised Statutes § 18.7.107. 
68  Official Code of Georgia § 16.11.90. 
69  Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Title 18 § 3131. 
70  Texas Penal Code § 21.15. 
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There is no intention that anyone receives sexual gratification in this example, and thus 
the offence would seem inapposite.  
 
California’s law71 is similar to the English offence except it requires not only an intent to 
cause ‘serious emotional distress’ but also that the same occurs. ‘Serious’ adds an even 
stronger element into the mens rea than  under the English law and it raises the problem 
of what ‘serious’ emotional distress is. The requirement that the victim must, in fact, be 
caused serious emotional distress is also problematic as it treats victims differently 
according to whether they are aware of the disclosure. It creates an interesting ethical 
question for the police: 
 
D records herself having sexual intercourse with V. D decides to place the 
footage onto a sex site because she is annoyed at how V treated her, and knows 
the disclosure will cause her shame and distress. The police, when investigating 
another case, come across V’s image. 
 
In this example do the police tell V? If they do not, the crime will not have been 
committed (because V is so far unaware of the footage and so cannot be distressed) but 
if they do, have the police not, in part, caused the distress (albeit by acting properly)?  
 
The varying approaches adopted in America demonstrate how difficult it is to draft a law 
to tackle this behaviour. The range of behaviour covered by the notion of ‘revenge porn’ 
is very broad, and it can be conducted for a range of reasons.  
 
Conclusion 
The issue of ‘revenge porn’ has captured the imagination of the public in recent years. 
There is no doubt that those who post images or footage of another without their 
consent are acting in an offensive way. It is also clear that some victims of revenge 
pornography suffer emotional harm or other consequences, such as embarrassment and 
loss of employment. To that extent it is clear that the law needs to act against those who 
do distribute this material. 
 
                                                 
71  California Penal Code § 647(j)(4). 
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However it is unclear that s.33 is the solution. This article has noted the flaws within the 
drafting of the offence, including the unusual mens rea requirement. This author believes 
that requiring mens rea is necessary, and so the New Jersey offence arguably goes too far. 
However restricting the mens rea to an intention to distress is limiting when it should 
cover other purposes, including harassment. There is also the difficulty of s.33(8) which  
adds a level of uncertainty that is to be regretted. It would have been simpler for the law 
to simply recognise that an individual has the right to control his or her sexual identity, 
and this includes not having it manipulated for nefarious reasons. A defence of legitimate 
reason could have been introduced to cater for those rare situations when disclosure is 
necessary rather than, as now, limit it to law enforcement and journalistic purposes. 
 
It has been seen that the MCA 1988 and the CA 2003 could also have addressed this 
issue. The OPA 1959 can apply in theory, but prosecutions under that Act are 
problematic and can therefore be largely dismissed. However the MCA 1988, especially 
with its new maximum sentence, could be appropriate, especially as it has a broader mens 
rea.  
 
Introducing a specific offence can be useful. Speaking of the position in the USA, it has 
been noted that a problem with those seeking to criminalise revenge pornography ‘is a 
lack of empathy amongst the general population’72 and there is no reason why people in 
England & Wales may not similarly believe that victims are, in part, to blame for the 
release of the footage. Introducing a specific offence could help to change these 
attitudes. It introduces the general population to the real harm that can be caused by 
revenge pornography and marks its disapproval. Rather than relying on communications 
offences it labels the behaviour as something different: an attack against an individual, 
and a crime related to pornography. That is a noble aim, but s.33 of the Criminal Justice 
and Courts Act 2015 probably does not quite deliver on this, and that is something to be 
regretted. 
 
                                                 
72  Martinez, C. ‘An argument for states to outlaw ‘Revenge Porn’ and for Congress to Amend 47 
USC 230’ (2014) 1 Journal of  Technology Law and Policy 236-252 at 250. 
